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COMMENT
PROTECTION OF THE MEANS OF
GROUNDWATER DIVERSION

The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual

rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in
the various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates. Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when
appropriated, to the dignity of a distinct usufructory estate, or right
of property. ...

[A] nd vast expenditures of time and money have

been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our
unproductive territory. ... Deny the doctrine of priority or superi-

ority of right by priority of appropriation, and a great part of the
value of all this property is at once destroyed. 1
INTRODUCTION
As reflected in he words of Judge Helm in 1882, in Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co.,2 water in the west is a vital component of the
economic existence of the western states. Without water, the desert
remains barren and unproductive. With water, development, progress,
and prosperity are assured.
In Judge Helm's statement there lies an inherent conflict which
was, however, dormant in 1882. On the one hand was the need to
protect the rights of the individual and his "vast expenditures of time
and money" in developing the land. Underlying this need to protect
the rights of the individual was an apparently more fundamental
goal: the development of the state and its resources by encouraging
such investment. In 1882, the goal of development was served best
by protecting the individual right. Maximum development, however,
would necessarily require a curtailment of the individual right.
Future development of the economies of the western states would
eventually demand full utilization of water resources; without full
utilization, the future development of the state and its economy
would be limited to a level below its potential. But in the early days
of the west, full utilization of the resource was not the major concem. Of greater importance was the idea that individual rights in
1. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
2. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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water should be protected to encourage investment and hence development. Although contrary to established principles of water law,
this idea represented a reality of public policy in the west. Thus, the
pendulum of public policy had swung from the common law riparian extreme to its complete opposite, the right of the appropriator to
the water-first in time, first in right. Having reached this extreme,
the pendulum could swing back only toward the middle. Acute
demand for water since has attracted the pendulum of public policy
back to the point where the rights of the individual, while still recognized, are balanced against the present objective of maximizing water
resources. The individual right must at times be sacrificed in order
that the beneficial use of a state's waters can be maximized.

MESTAS v. ELEPHANT BUTTE IRRIGATION DISTRICT: A CASE STUDY
OF A CONFLICT RESULTING FROM A SHORTAGE OF WATER CREATED
BY INCREASING DEMAND
Along the Rio Grande in southern New Mexico, below Elephant
Butte Dam, is an apparently large fresh water aquifer. Although
farmers and others drilled wells as early as 1900, there was no significant development of the groundwater resource until the 1950ss
because, until that time, the Elephant Butte Irrigation District
(EBID) was able to meet demands with surface waters from the Rio
Grande.
EBID was established under state law4 to cooperate with the
United States Bureau of Reclamation in developing the waters of the
Rio Grande in order to encourage agricultural development. Until
1971, EBID, through the assessment of fees on its member-users, was
responsible to the United States for repayment of the construction
costs of the entire Rio Grande project. In 1971, the debt having been
retired, EBID assumed full control over the irrigation system.'
During the 1950s, New Mexico encountered a water shortage and
many farmers drilled irrigation wells to supplement the surface
waters delivered by EBID. 6 When surface water again became plentiful, most of these wells were no longer used. In the 1970s, however,
farmers were hit with another shortage of water and many were again
forced to rely on groundwater to meet their needs. Meanwhile, EBID
3. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 5 (D.N.M. May 11, 1979).
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-10-1 to 47 (1978).
5. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 3 (D.N.M. May 11, 1979).
6. Id. at 5. In addition, many wells were drilled by persons owning farms larger than 160
acres as they apparently feared enforcement of 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976) limiting the availability of project water to farms less than or equal to 160 acres. Id. at 5, n.2.
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began studying the possibility of drilling wells to supplement project
surface water in times of shortage.
In 1973, EBID drilled its first well and within approximately one
year four others were drilled, all clustered together in the southern

part of the district in an area where water was in relatively high
demand. The Bureau of Reclamation held fee simple title to the
rights of way on this land. The initial expenditure in drilling these
wells was made from the reserve fund of the district, to be paid back
from sales of the groundwater to member-users who desired to supplement their normal surface water delivery. The wells were operational in 1975, but it was not until 1977 when a shortage of water
meant that surface water deliveries would not meet demand, that
EBID began to use the wells and sell the groundwater. During the
1977 and most of the 1978 growing season, EBID pumped all of its
wells 24 hours a day.
During those years, farmers in the vicinity of the EBID wells who
had themselves drilled wells and had been relying upon the water,
began to discover that their wells were not performing as before;
both the quantity and quality of the water had diminished. As a
result, the 1977 and 1978 growing seasons were more expensive for
these farmers. Their wells, most drilled to depths below 200 feet,
performed less efficiently than before and allegedly were producing
more saline water. The reason for the higher salt content in the water
was that saline water from shallower regions of the aquifer (above
200 feet) was now being forced into lower stratas of the permeable
aquifer. This resulted from a pressure gradient 7 caused by the EBID
drilling.
Suit was brought by these farmers, who were member-users of
EBID, against EBID and the United States in 1978 in Mestas v.
Elephant Butte Irrigation District.8 Plaintiffs asked that EBID be
enjoined from operating the existing 5 wells and from constructing
new wells. In the alternative, they asked that EBID be compelled to
apportion the water derived from its wells pro rata within the district, should the court conclude that EBID had the authority to use
its excess funds to drill the wells on Bureau of Reclamation property.
Plaintiffs asked also that the court order the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to cease to cooperate with EBID because the Bureau had acted
outside of its authority in allowing the wells to be drilled on its own
property.
7. As water was withdrawn from EBID's deep wells, a gradient developed between the
deep and shallow sections of the aquifer causing the more saline water from the shallow
section to be drawn downward and to mix with the less saline deep water. Mestas v.
Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 4 (D.N.M. May 11, 1979).
8. No. 78-138B (D.N.M. May 11, 1979).
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The substance of plaintiffs case was that, as a result of the drilling
of the 5 EBID wells, their prior appropriative right to the groundwater had been impaired. In that connection, the argument was made
that EBID had no authority to drill the wells and that the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation was without authority to allow the wells to
be drilled on its rights of way.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted partial summary
judgment for EBID on one issue, holding that it did have authority
to drill the wells. 9 All other matters were reserved for trial. The trial
was held in January, 1979. The court concluded that the wells drilled
by EBID did not impair the water rights of the prior appropriators
(plaintiffs) because the EBID wells did not relate to the integrity of
the water right, but only to the functioning of the wells.' 0 The court
apparently ignored any concept that concomitant to the appropriative right itself was a right to an historical means of diversion, i.e.,
the right to a properly functioning well.
This comment will address the troublesome problems presented by
the Mestas case. Of concern is how society, when required to decide
among conflicting demands for the use of water, balances the rights
of the individual to his appropriative right and his concurrent right to
his means of diversion against the demands of a growing economy
that requires maximum development of water resources. The author
will discuss where New Mexico, in light of or in spite of Mestas,
should strike this balance.
THE LAW OF GROUNDWATER IN THE WEST
Prior to a discussion of the Mestas decision in more detail, and
before analyzing the case law concerning the right to a means of
diversion, it is necessary to examine the law of groundwater in the
west, with emphasis on New Mexico's groundwater law. This will
provide a setting in which to consider the Mestas holding and its
ramifications.
In the United States, rights to the use of water arise within the
context of one of two doctrines, riparian rights or prior appropriation. Under the common law riparian doctrine, water rights arise
from and are incident to the ownership of land adjoining a stream or
watercourse. 1 Under prior appropriation, the water right is not incident to the ownership of land and does not arise by means of land
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 15.
11. A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 231 (1970).
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ownership. Rather, water rights are acquired by appropriation under
a " 'first-in-time, first-in-right' system."' 2
Development of the economies of the western states and territories necessitated that investments in time and money be protected,
encouraging such investments in order to develop the land. The law
of prior appropriation suited these purposes ideally. Today nine
western states follow the Colorado Doctrine of prior appropriation as
espoused in the Coffin case and have completely repudiated riparian
rights.'
Other states follow pure riparian notions, 1 4 while others
have adopted the California Doctrine,'
a combination of prior
appropriative law and riparian rights.
New Mexico has adopted the Colorado Doctrine, initially by case
law' 6 and subsequently in its Constitution' I and Statutes.' 8 New
Mexico never has recognized riparian ownership in water rights,' '
and has retained the prior appropriation system with respect to both
groundwater and surface water.2 0 Not all prior appropriation states
have done likewise. In the area of groundwater law, the western
states have followed four doctrinal paths: the common law or absolute ownership rule; correlative rights; reasonable use; and prior
appropriation. 2
Under the common law rule, the owner of the soil enjoys the right
2
"to divert, appropriate, and use percolating waters as he sees fit," 2
the right being one "of property attached to the ownership of the
soil, and enforced as such." '2 3 Under the pure common law rule, the
owner of the land has an absolute right to withdraw the water from
below his land, regardless both of the purpose to which he puts the
water and the effect of the withdrawal on his neighbors' water supply. Texas still adheres to the common law rule, with the limitation
12. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States,
-Colo. -,
589 P.2d 57, 64 (1979), (ERICKSON, J., dissenting).
13. The states following the "Colorado Doctrine" are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 5 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 400 n.21 (1972).
14. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 11, 12 (2d ed. 1974).
15. The states following the "California Doctrine" are California, Kansas, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. 5 R. CLARK,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 400 n.22 (1972).
16. Hagerman Irrigation Dist. v. McMurray, 16 N.M. 172, 181, 113 P. 823, 825 (1911).
17. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 72-1-1, 72-12-1 (1978).
19. Hagerman Irrigation Dist. v. McMurray, 16 N.M. 172, 181, 113 P. 823, 825 (1911).
20. Yea v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 620-24, 286 P. 970, 974-76 (1929); N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 72-12-18 (1978).
21. 5 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 441 (1972).
22. Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 357, 94 N.W. 354, 357 (1903).

23. Id
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".... that the owner may not maliciously take water for the sole
purpose of injuring his neighbor." 2
The correlative rights doctrine and the reasonable use doctrine are
modifications of the common law rule of absolute ownership. The
reasonable use doctrine is essentially identical to the common law
doctrine, with the additional requirement that the water withdrawn
be applied to a beneficial use on the land from which it is taken. "If
it is diverted for the purpose of making reasonable use of the land
from which it is taken, there is no liability incurred to an adjoining
owner for a resulting damage." ' 2 The correlative rights doctrine differs from the reasonable use scheme in that the taking of water is
limited "when there is scarcity thereof, to only the landowner's proportionate share thereof."2 6 The doctrine of correlative rights
demands an analysis of the effect of the reasonable use of water on
other lands, adjoining or affected by such use.2 7
In the area of groundwater, the doctrines of absolute ownership,
correlative rights, and reasonable use stand juxtaposed inrelation to
the prior appropriation doctrine.
THE LAW OF GROUNDWATER IN NEW MEXICO: THE DECLARED BASIN/
NON-DECLARED BASIN DISTINCTION
Because water is a scarce commodity in New Mexico, in times of
shortage or in areas where surface flow is minimal or non-existent,
the available groundwater must supply that need. In New Mexico, no
permit or license is required to appropriate groundwater unless the
well is located in a declared basin as designated by the State Engineer. 2 8 But 59 percent of the state has been declared to be located
within one of 27 basins. 2 Relatively few areas remain beyond the
reach and influence of the New Mexico State Engineer.
24. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus. Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Tex.
1978). The case contains a very good discussion of the history of the common law rule and
its application in Texas. Apparently Texas now allows a negligence action against persons
whose groundwater withdrawals have caused subsidence of neighboring lands. See Note, 20
NAT. RES. J. 375 (1980) which discusses Friendswood in detail. See also, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
25. Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173, 180 (1953).
26. Id., 255 P.2d at 178. The court therein specifically rejected the correlative rights
doctrine in Arizona and adopted the reasonable use doctrine.
27. See the definition of correlative rights contained within N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 71-5-3(c) (1978), as it pertains to the rights of an owner of property in a geothermal field.
New Mexico adopts the correlative rights concept as to geothermal resources and empowers
the Oil Conservation Commission to protect correlative rights. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-7

(1978).
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-20 (1978).
29. STATE ENGINEER, RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING DRILLING OF
WELLS AND APPROPRIATION AND USE OF GROUNDWATER IN NEW MEXICO iv.
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One area not located within one of the 27 declared basins is the
watershed below Elephant Butte Dam along the Rio Grande in southern New Mexico. For several reasons,3 o the State Engineer has taken
no steps to declare the boundaries of the basin so as to bring it
within his reach. Therefore, in Mestas v. EBID,3 1 the State Engineer
was not a party to the lawsuit. Normally, in a declared basin, the
State Engineer would not be at liberty to grant an application to drill
until notice had been published, 32 and until he had determined
either that there existed unappropriated water in the basin or that
any new appropriation would not impair existing rights.3 3 Had the
area in Mestas been within a declared basin, plaintiffs claiming impairment of their wells would have brought suit against the State
Engineer directly, challenging his finding of no impairment, had such
been the case.
New Mexico Case Law on Impairment: DeclaredBasins and the
Involvement of the State Engineer
New Mexico case law concerning impairment deals with situations
where the State Engineer had declared the basins to be within his
jurisdiction. Such cases stand in contrast with the Mestas scenario.
The issue in Mestas was the existence rel non of impairment and the
decision reached by the court was predicated upon the New Mexico
(1966), listing 26 declared underground water basins. Subsequently, on March 4, 1980 the
State Engineer declared a 27th basin, the Gallup Underground Water Basin. STATE ENGINEER, ORDER No. 125 (1980).
30. The predominant reason is that the delivery point of New Mexico's Rio Grande water
committment to Texas is Elephant Butte Dam. Below that point, the State Engineer is
apparently unconcerned with the taking of groundwater despite the interrelationship between surface and subsurface waters along the Rio Grande, as New Mexico's obligation to
Texas has already been met. Another reason is that the area, until recently, has not made
substantial use of the groundwater.
31. No. 78-138B (D.N.M. May 11, 1979).
32. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3(D) (1978).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3(E) (1978). Note that the impairment of existing rights
criteria limiting the State Engineer from granting an application to appropriate also applies
where application has been made to change the location of existing wells. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-12-7 (1978). Note also, that any decision of the State Engineer can be appealed to the
District Court, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-10 (1978), the proceeding upon appeal being de
novo. N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 5. At one point in New Mexico, the district court, on
appeal, would not overturn the findings of the State Engineer unless it could be proved that
the findings were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Spencer v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 287
P.2d 221 (1955); In Re Hobson, 64 N.M. 462, 330 P.2d 547 (1958); Heine v. Reynolds, 69
N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962); Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d
763 (1963). That rule was overturned, however, in Application of Carlsbad Irrigation Dist.,
87 N.M. 149, 530 P.2d 943 (1974), in which the court held that the district court on appeal
could hear additional evidence, could form its own conclusion based upon the additional
evidence and would not be limited by the fraudulent, capricious, or arbitrary standard.
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law of impairment within the context of declared basins where the
State Engineer is involved. In addition, most of the New Mexico case
law on impairment involves applications for changes in well locations, rather than applications for new appropriations.
The four pertinent cases are Application of Brown,3 4 Heine v.
Reynolds, a" Roswell v. Reynolds, a 6 and Mathers v. Texaco. 3 7 In
Application of Brown,3 8 the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a
decision by the State Engineer granting a change in well location
based upon the State Engineer's determination that there would be
no impairment, despite the fact that the well had been drilled prior
to the State Engineer's approval of the application for the well. In its
decision on a motion for rehearing, 3 9 the Brown court enunciated
the rule on impairment in New Mexico:
The lowering of a water table in any particular amount does not
necessarily constitute an impairment of water rights of adjoining
appropriators. The amount that the water table is lowered is an
important factor, but in addition all characteristics of
40 the particular
aquifer must be considered along with well locations.
In Heine v. Reynolds,4 1 the State Engineer denied an application
for a change in well location based upon his finding that the proposed change would impair existing groundwater rights due to an
increase in salinity that would have resulted. At issue was the degree
of impairment which must result to justify denial of an application
to change a well location. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that because the applicable statute 2 did not read substantial
impairment, but merely impairment, the State Engineer was correct
in finding that sufficient impairment would result to justify rejecting
the application. The court specifically refused, however, to define
impairment, stating that a decision as to the existence of impairment
had to be made on a case by case basis, and that any attempt to
34. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
35. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).

36. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
37. 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
38. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
39. Motion for Rehearing, Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 80, 332 P.2d 475, 478

(1958).
40. Id. at 479. In so doing, the court upheld Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 80, 332
P.2d 475, 478 (1958), which held that numerous factors concerning the aquifer had to be
examined by the court, including but not limited to a decline in the water table, in order to
decide if impairment would result from granting a change in well locations to an appropriator.
41. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-7 (1978).
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define impairment "would lead to severe complications." 4 Implicit
in the Heine decision was a recognition that a change in water quality, as well as in quantity, was a valid consideration in deciding
whether existing water rights would be impaired.
Mathers v. Texaco 4 4 involved an attempt by the Texaco Oil Company to appropriate groundwater for use in secondary recovery operations at one of its oil fields. Texaco sought to appropriate the water
from the Lea County Artesian Underground Basin, a non-recharging
basin replenished only by minimal surface precipitation. The New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld the decision of the State Engineer
that there would be no impairment of the rights of prior appropriators if Texaco's application were granted.4 I The court rejected plaintiff's argument that there would be per se impairment resulting from
Texaco's use, given the nature of the non-rechargeable basin. The
Mathers opinion stated that if that were the appropriate analysis, any
use subsequent to the original user in a non-rechargeable basin would
amount to an impairment of that initial appropriator's right.4 6 The
court reiterated its holding in Application of Brown4 7 that a lowering of the water table does not, as a matter of law, constitute an
impairment of existing rights. The Mathers court concluded that the
lowering of the water table was the inevitable result of the beneficial
use by the public of underground waters.4 8
In City of Roswell v. Reynolds,4 9 the New Mexico Supreme Court
considered an appeal by the City of Roswell from a decision by the
State Engineer which placed conditions upon approval of the city's
application to change its well locations. The proviso was that the city
decrease the quantity and rate of withdrawal from its new well locations. It was the conclusion of the State Engineer, affirmed by the
district court on appeal, that no impairment of existing rights would
result from a change in well locations restricted by such conditions.
The city contended that no impairment would result even without
the imposition of the conditions. The Supreme Court agreed with
Roswell that under the rule enunciated by Mathers and Application
of Brown" ° a "lowering of the water table does not necessarily
43. Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 402, 367 P.2d 708, 711 (1962).
44. 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
45. Id. at 246, 421 P.2d at 777 (1966). The State Engineer, however, in reaching that
decision limited the quantity of water which Texaco could withdraw to just under one half
that originally requested by Texaco.
46. Id. at 244-45, 421 P.2d at 775.
47. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
48. Mathers v. Texaco, 77 N.M. at 246, 421 P.2d at 776.
49. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
50. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
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constitute an impairment of . . . water rights. . . ," but went on to
say that "it does not follow that the lowering of the water table may
never in itself constitute an impairment of existing rights." 5 1 The
decision of the State Engineer was affirmed, and the conditions to
the application to change well locations were held valid. Implicit in
the decision was the notion that without the conditions imposed by
the State Engineer, the resulting lowering of the water table and
potential increase in the salinity of the water could amount to an
impairment of existing rights.
Of significance in the above cases is the fact that they all concerned declared basins and involved the State Engineer. Additionally,
in Mathers, the aquifer was non-recharging. In Mestas, however, the
basin in question was neither a declared basin nor a non-rechargeable
basin. It is therefore arguable, ceterus paribus, that the above cases
are of little significance in deciding whether impairment exists under
the facts in Mestas.
Burdens of Proofin New Mexico Impairment Cases: Declaredand
Non-DeclaredBasins
Another difference between declared basin cases and non-declared
basin cases is that the burdens of proof imposed by the courts on
those claiming to be impaired differ. In cases involving the State
Engineer and a declared basin, the burden is on the subsequent
appropriator to show that there is unappropriated water in the
basin.' 2 In non-declared basin cases, however, the rule is that announced in Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District v. Peters. 3
In Pecos Valley, 4 the court stated that while normally the bur51. City of Roswell v. Reynolds, 85 N.M. 249, 253, 522 P.2d 796, 800 (1974).
52. Spencer v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955); In Re Hobson, 64 N.M. 462, 330
P.2d 547 (1958); Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962); City of Roswell v.
Reynolds, 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974); Mathers v. Texaco, 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d
771 (1966).
53. 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948). Note that this is the second appeal taken to the
New Mexico Supreme Court in the same case, the first being 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d 490
(1945) The first suit concerned whether the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District was
authorized under statute to maintain a suit against an individual residing outside of the
boundaries of the District. The Supreme Court concluded that the District was authorized
to sue, and therefore remanded the case for trial.
54. 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948). In the case, Defendant, Peters, drilled a well for
irrigation purposes. At the time the well was drilled, Defendant did not have or need a
permit from the State Engineer since the well location was not within the declared boundaries of the Roswell Artesian Basin, though the well tapped the same aquifer. The Basin,
however, had been decared by the State Engineer to have had no unappropriated water.
The Plaintiff Conservancy District thus sued, asking that the Defendant be perpetually
enjoined from withdrawing water, contending that there existed no unappropriated water
and that any further appropriation by Defendant would amount to impairment of Plaintiffs
existing rights.
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den would be placed on the person asserting impairment in his pleading, in cases involving impairment by subsequent appropriators the
burden of proof is on the subsequent appropriator. The Pecos Valley
opinion, citing a number of California cases, s embraced a rule
placing the burden of proof on the subsequent appropriator to show
the existence of unappropriated water, but only after the party
claiming injury has proved "the quantity of water that they have
been using, and that such amount is necessary for their reasonable
beneficial purposes."' 6 This apparently is the current rule as to burdens of proof imposed in non-declared basin cases in New Mexico. In
a specially concurring opinion, Justice Sadler noted that such a rule
had the effect of precluding
injunctive relief against unlawful raids on the existing water supply
...because of the sheer expense to a plaintiff of making the hydrographic survey and furnishing the proof essential in establishing the
prima facie case necessary to shift the burden to subsequent appro5
priator [sic] of showing there is a surplus. 7

In none of the above cases, or in any New Mexico case, has a right
to a means of diversion been addressed. Because New Mexico is a
prior appropriation state, and since the right to a means of diversion
is merely an element of the appropriative right, it is axiomatic to
conclude that such a right exists in New Mexico. New Mexico courts
simply have never been presented with a case in which a right to a
means of diversion was asserted. It is, therefore, necessary to look to
the law of other prior appropriation states to examine the right to,
and the extent of, a means of groundwater diversion.
PROTECTION OF THE MEANS OF GROUNDWATER DIVERSION:
PRIVATE RIGHTS v. PUBLIC POLICY
Establishment of the Concept
The first four American cases addressing the right of an appropriator to his means of groundwater diversion were Pima Farms v. Proc55. Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910); Peabody v. Vallejo,
2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation
Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935); Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist., 7 CaL2d
316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
56. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist. v. Peters, 52 N.M. at 153, 193 P.2d at 421,
quoting from Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dis., 3 Cal.2d 489, 45
P.2d 972, 991 (1935). The rule applied to the facts of the Pecos case meant that although
the Defendant, Peters (the subsequent appropriator) had the burden of showing that unappropriated water existed, the Plaintiff Conservancy District first had to show the quantity
of water that they had been using and that that amount was necessary for their reasonable
beneficial purposes. Since Plaintiffs, however, did not meet their burden, they were unsuccessful in their attempt to enjoin the Defendant's use of the water.
57. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist. v. Peters, 52 N.M. at 162, 193 P.2d at 427
(SADLER, J., concurring).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

tor,5 8 Noh v. Stoner,' 9 Faden v. Hubbell,6 0 and Lodi v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District.6 ' These cases provided the foundation for
the modem rule, the Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion.
6 2 plaintiffs wells were
In Pima Farms v. Proctor,
no longer able
to meet his water needs due to the lowering of the water table by a
subsequent appropriator. Having once adjusted his well depth to
compensate for the declining water table, plaintiff brought suit when
this adjustment proved inadequate. There was no question that there
was an ample water supply. The issue centered around the fact that it
would take additional equipment at "substantial cost" 6 I for plaintiff
to maintain his wells. Plaintiff argued that, as prior appropriator, he
was entitled to a level of water sufficient to allow him to capture the
water with the equipment he had originally installed. In lieu thereof,
plaintiff asked that the court order defendant to supply him with a
quantity of water sufficient to make up the loss. 64 Defendant's
response, not unlike that of the defendant in Mestas, was that only
the water right itself was entitled to protection and so long as water
existed, that right remained unimpaired, regardless of the depth to
which plaintiff eventually would have to drill to find water.
The Pima court agreed with plaintiff that a prior appropriator's
rights are superior and that to hold for defendant would render the
senior appropriator's rights subservient to the junior's rights. 6 s The
court further observed that to allow a junior appropriator to impair
the senior appropriator's means of diversion would not "comport
with justice and equity, nor ... [be] in conformity with the spirit of
the rules adopted by the courts for the adjustment of disputes over
water and it use in the and regions of the West."'6 6 Recognizing the
importance of maximizing the beneficial use of water, the court
granted an injunction restraining defendant from pumping groundwater until a plan acceptable to the court was drawn up whereby
defendant would furnish plaintiff with his water, at reasonable
rates. 6 7 The Pima court distinguished its facts from the classic case
58. 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
59. 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933).
60. 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933).
61. 7 CaL2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
62. 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
63. Pima Farms v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369, 370 (1926).
64. Id
65. Id., 245 P. at 371.
66. Id., 245 P. at 373.
67. Note that since the decision in Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369
(1926), Arizona has rejected the prior appropriation system as to groundwater, in favor of
the doctrine of reasonable use. See, Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173
(1953). The effect of that decision renders inapplicable the decision in Pima Farns giving a
senior appropriator a right of action against subsequent appropriators for maintenance of
the water table.
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of Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co. 6 8 While protecting
plaintiff's rights to water by compelling the junior appropriator to
supply plaintiff with a quantity sufficient to meet his needs, the
Pima court also allowed for development of the water resource
beyond its first appropriation.
In Noh v. Stoner,6 9 plaintiffs were prior appropriators of water in
an artesian basin and sued for injunctive relief when subsequent
appropriation by defendants impaired their right. Defendants contended that it was plaintiffs duty to provide adequately for his own
pumping system, as there existed ample water from which to satisfy
his prior right. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, observing that
such a policy would serve only to encourage a race to the bottom of
the aquifer, and held that if defendants desired to instigate such a
race, "the financial burden must rest on them and with no injury to
the prior appropriators or loss of their water." 7 0 Thus, regardless of
the reasonableness of the prior appropriator's means of diversion and
its impact on future development, the Noh court held that a prior
appropriator had an absolute right to his historical means and level of
diversion. 7 1
The 1933 Colorado case of Faden v. Hubbell7 2 involved a suit for
an injunction against defendants' actions which had forced plaintiffs
to change their manner of diversion. The defendants' change in their
diversion amounted to an interference with plaintiff's prior right to
the water. The court upheld the injunction granted below, stating
such a remedy lies to prevent the wrongful7 3diversion of water from
those otherwise entitled to he groundwater.
In Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District,74 the city of Lodi,
prior appropriator of groundwater for municipal water purposes,
sought injunctive relief from defendants' diversion of river flow.
Plaintiff contended that defendants' diversion would interfere with
68. 224 U.S. 107 (1912). In the case, the United States Supreme Court decided that an
appropriator of water was not entitled to maintenance of the current of the stream, upon
which he depended to run his water wheel used to divert waters for his beneficial use. The
decision apparently rested on the unreasonableness of the means of diversion which required
the entire current and flow of the stream to effectuate the diversion. The diversion, which
the court ruled unreasonable, would have prevented subsequent appropriations which would
have affected the current. Note that no state court has followed the Schodde view that
pressure can't be appropriated. Comment, South Dakota Artesian Pressure, 16 S.D.L. REV.

481, 490 (1971).
69. 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933).
70. Nohv. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1933).
71. Note that Noh v. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933), to the extent that it
held that a prior appropriator was entitled to maintenance of historical pumping levels,
regardless of the reasonableness of that level of diversion, was over-ruled by Baker v. Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).

72. 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933).
73. Id, 28 P.2d at 251.
74. 7 Cal.2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
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recharge of the underground strata upon which it depended for
municipal water. The California Supreme Court held that a prior
appropriator could not be "compelled to incur any material expense
in order to accommodate the subsequent appropriator ' 7 5 although
it "may be required to make minor changes in its method of appropriation in order to render available water for subsequent appropria7
tors." 6

The California Supreme Court thereby enunciated the requirement
that the means of diversion, while entitled to protection, also must
be reasonable. The case was remanded for consideration by the trial
court of the question as to whether physical solutions, rather than an
injunction, could be imposed whereby the city would receive the
water to which it was entitled without mandating a less than maximum use of the water resource. In other words, the court was suggesting a remedy not unlike that in Pima Farms whereby defendant
7
would be forced to help make up plaintiff's water needs. Hutchins 7
concluded that the above decisions uniformly gave the prior appropriator rights in the quantity of groundwater that historically had
been diverted, and enjoined any interference causing a lowering of
78
the water table.
Evolution of the Modern Rule
The next three cases of significance in this area all are Utah cases.
These cases are of interest because they demonstrate the change in
emphasis which time and the ever-increasing demand for water have
brought to this area of the law.
In Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 7 9 plaintiffs, who had relied upon the
natural flow of water from an artesian well, brought suit for an
injunction and damages against Salt Lake City. The city had drilled
wells which were interfering with the natural flow of plaintiffs' well.
As a result of the interference, plaintiffs had to install pumps. It was
the contention of the city that plaintiffs had no right which had been
impaired. The Utah Supreme Court held, however, that the subsequent appropriator must bear the expense of the prior appropriator
in bringing to the surface water which otherwise flowed naturally, in
order to comport with "the well established rule as to surface
75. Id., 60 P.2d at 450.

76. Id., 60 P.2d at 45051.
77. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER IN THE WEST 175

(1942).
78. Id at 176-79.
79. 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949).
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waters."' 0 The court cited Pima Farms,Noh v. Stoner, and Lodi as
having squarely resolved the issue.
The Hanson court went on to hold that the prior appropriator's
water right includes his means of diversion "as long as such means are
reasonably efficient and do not unreasonably waste water."' It was
stated that this rule would not unreasonably inhibit the fullest development of water resources, countering Hutchins' criticism of the
principle. 8 2 The court also noted that it believed that such a rule was
mandated by legislative policy. In concurring opinions, several justices stressed the "reasonableness" requirement of the Hanson precedent and cautioned against a broad application of it.8 I
Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews8 4 applied the rule developed by Hanson v. Salt Lake City broadly, however, to the point of
ignoring any requirement that the means of diversion be reasonable.
The Andrews court held that prior appropriators using the natural
flow of an artesian spring were "entitled to have the subsequent
appropriators restrained from ...lowering the static head pressure
...unless they replace the quantity and quality of the water by
pumping or other means to the prior appropriators at the sole cost of
the subsequent appropriators."' s The court relied on a Utah statute8 6 which stated that "replacement shall be at the sole cost of the
applicant ...whose appropriation may diminish the quality or injuriously affect the quality of (prior) appropriated underground
8
water.", 7
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Crockett, who was to write the
majority opinion in the third Utah case, Wayman v. Murray City
Corporation,8 a criticized the majority opinion, contending that it
assumed the existence "of an absolute right in a prior user of underground water to have not only the water, but also to have the pressure and the means of diversion preserved inviolate." 8 I He added
that it was "an illusion to regard any right as absolute," 9 0 and stated
that such an application of the rule was to ignore the fundamental
purpose of western water law: the maximum development and use of
80. Id, 205 P.2d at 263.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id, 205 P.2d at 263.
Id, 205 P.2d at 262 citing supra note 77, at 174-77.
Id, 205 P.2d at 264-75 (concurring opinions).
9 Utah2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959).

85. Id, 344 P.2d at 531.
86. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1953).
87. Id.
88. Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah2d 97, 458 P.2d 861 (1969).
89. Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 9 Utah2d 324, 344 P.2d 528, 533 (1959)
(CROCKETT, J., dissenting).
90. Id, 344 P.2d at 533.
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water. Conceding the influence of the statute, 9' Judge Crockett
noted that the reasonableness of diversion analysis, as set out in
Hanson, did not interfere with the statute. In his dissenting opinion,
he observed:
The effect of the view represented by the majority opinion is that
the pendulum of the law relating to underground waters has by a
somewhat tortuous process swung from the pristine view that the
landowner had absolute right to the waters in his soil to the opposite
extreme that the prior user has absolute and inviolable rights in the
water. I subscribe to neither of these extremes, but believe the principals upon which a fair and practicable method of allocating and
administering rights in underground waters is to be found somewhere in between them. 9 2
It is in Wayman v. Murray City Corporation,9 3 that the Rule of
Reasonableness is enunciated clearly in the majority opinion of Justice Crockett. In Wayman, plaintiffs sued the Murray City Corporation and the State Engineer, contending that a change in the city's
well locations had diminished the flow of water from their domestic
wells. The trial court found for plaintiffs, and ordered defendants to
replace, at their sole cost, the water to plaintiffs in a quality and
quantity equal to that existing prior to the change in well locations.
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, that court first examined
the geology of the aquifer, concluding that there was not a water
shortage, but merely a decline in pressure affecting plaintiff's ability
to withdraw water. Expressing the important role of water in arid
states and the need to maximize the development of that resource,
the court cited the apparent conflict between that goal and the Utah
statute, 94 which mandated that an individual appropriator's rights be
protected. To resolve that conflict, the court stated that it was necessary to analyze the total situation and balance the competing interests; that is, the concerns of the individual appropriator would be
compared with those of the public which demand full beneficial use
of water, so as to best serve the overall objectives of Utah water
law. 9 The court then noted the emergence of a new principle in groundwater allocation law, the Rule of Reasonableness. It stated that the
rule:
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1953).
92. Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 9 Utah2d 324, 344 P.2d 528, 535 (1959),
(CROCKETT, J., dissenting).
93. 23 Utah2d 97,458 P.2d 861 (1969).
94. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1953).
95. Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d at 864.
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involves an analysis of the total situation: the quantity of water
available, the average annual recharge in the basin, the existing rights
and their priorities. All users are required where necessary to employ
reasonable and efficient means in taking their own waters in relation
to others to the end that wastage of water is avoided
and the greatest
96
amount of available water is put to beneficial use.
Colorado Springs v. Bender9 I and Hutchins 9 8 were cited as
authorities for taking an approach similar to that encompassed by
the Rule of Reasonableness. The rule, while seemingly in conflict
with the Utah statute, 9 9 was nevertheless in harmony with the major
objectives of the law. "[T] he means of diversion must be reasonable
and consistent with the state of development of water in the area and
not such as to abort the declared purpose of the law of putting all of
available water to use." 1 0 0
The Rule of ReasonablenessFurther Clarified
There are two other cases of importance in this area, both clearly
applying and enunciating the Rule of Reasonableness: Colorado
Springs v. Bender' 0' and Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. 1 0 2 In Colorado Springs v. Bender, suit was brought by a senior appropriator
against a junior appropriator to enjoin the junior appropriator's use
of water. A prayer for damages was included. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision granting an
injunction.
The Bender opinion first cited the case Shodde v. Twin Falls Land
& Water Company' a for the proposition that, when applied to a
groundwater situation, a prior appropriator's means of diversion
must be reasonable and efficient. Otherwise, the court reasoned, even
though adequate quantities of water exist at greater depths, a well at
a shallow depth would prevent others from using the water. The
court recognized another fundamental principle applicable equally to
ground as well as to surface water, "that a junior appropriator may
not divert the water to which he is entitled by any method or means
the result of which will be to diminish or interfere with the right of a
senior appropriator to full use of his appropriation." ' 0°
96. Id., 458 P.2d at 865.
97. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
98. Supra note 77, at 179.
99. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1953).
100. Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d at 866.
101. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
102. 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
103. 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
104. Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (1961).
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Bender was remanded to the trial court with instructions to obtain
new evidence as to the rate of flow of the competing junior and
senior appropriators, their dates of priority, and the elevations of
water within the aquifer at which the junior appropriators would
have to cease their diversions in order to meet the demands of the
senior appropriator.' 0 5 The Colorado Supreme Court stated that in
determining the elevation at which the subsequent appropriator
should be required to cease diversion, the method and conditions
surrounding the senior appropriator's diversion must be examined.
Of import was "whether he [the prior appropriator] has created a
means of diversion from the aquifer which is reasonably adequatefor
the use to which he has historically put the water of his appropriation"' 06 (emphasis added). The court added that when the senior's
means of diversion fails because of actions of a junior appropriator,
the junior appropriator should be made to pay for the change in the
senior appropriator's method of diversion, if it is possible to reach a
supply adequate to meet the senior appropriator's needs. The court
added that it is "unreasonable to require the senior to supply such
means out of his own financial resources."' 0 7
The Bender court, however, stated that consideration must be
given to whether the prior appropriator should first be required to
make his own means of diversion more efficient with due regard
being given to the purposes of the diversion and his "economic
reach." It added,
The plaintiffs cannot reasonably "command the whole" source of
supply merely to facilitate the taking by them of a fraction of the
entire flow to which their senior appropriation entitles them. On the
other hand, plaintiffs cannot be required to improve their extraction
facilities beyond their economic reach, upon a consideration of all
the factors involved.' 0 8
The Bender decision is significant in that it calls for an economic
balancing, counseling that while a senior appropriator's right of diversion is not absolute, it is nevertheless substantial. While the senior
right will never forestall development of water resources, the individual appropriator's rights are protected. The extent to which the prior
appropriator will be compensated, if at all, depends in part upon his
financial ability to keep pace with the technology which would be
required to adequately supply his appropriative right. Thus, the prior
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

366
366
366
366

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at
at
at
at

556.
556.
556.
556.
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appropriator cannot always demand maintenance of his historical
means or level of diversion but, if necessary due to financial inability,
he can apparently demand compensation from a junior appropriator
enabling him to drill deeper to protect his prior appropriative right.
The Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion as espoused in Bender subsequently was codified in Colorado. 1 09 The "statutory doctrine"
apparently also adopts the principle that a junior appropriator must
pay for the cost of improving the senior appropriator's means of
diversion.' 1 0
Also of note is the recent Colorado decision in A-B Cattle Company v. United States,' ' which suggests that Colorado courts perhaps would not, in the future, apply the Doctrine of Reasonable
Diversion as liberally as it was applied in Bender. In A-B Cattle
Company, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the owner of a water
right does not have a right to a historical quality of his water supply,
at least with respect to the silt content of the water. As pointed out
in the dissent,' 12 A-B Cattle Company ignores the economic reach
analysis set out in Bender and other Colorado cases.' 1 3 Arguably,
A-B Cattle Company indicates that the Supreme Court of Colorado is
retreating from its broad holding on the rights of a prior appropriator
in his means of diversion. The exact effects that A-B Cattle Company
will have on the Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion are unknown
although one can conclude that Colorado courts may be less inclined
to adhere strictly to the Bender decision in the future.
Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods Inc.' ' represented a reversal of the broad
holding of Noh v. Stoner,' I S to the extent that Noh gave the prior
appropriator an absolute right to his historical means of diversion.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated that such a rule was inconsistent
with the policy set forth in its Constitution and statutes that the
water resources of the state be optimally developed. The new rule, as
spelled out by the Baker court, will still protect the senior appropriator's right to a means of diversion but only to the extent that his
pumping levels are reasonable. The court stated that "[a] senior
appropriator is not absolutely protected in either his historic water
109. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-1 (1963), now COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102
(1973).
110. A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 179, 335 (1970).
111. __Colo. __,589 P.2d 57 (1979).
112. Id., 589 P.2d at 67-69 (1979) (ERICKSON, J., dissenting). Note that the decision
was 4-3 and thus extremely close. See, Note, 20 NAT. RES. J. 179 (1980), for a discussion
and criticism of the case.
113. Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
114. 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
115. 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933).
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level or his historic means of diversion. Our Groundwater Act contemplates that in some situations senior appropriators may have to
accept some modification of their
rights in order to achieve the goal
'
of full economic development." 1 6
The decision in Baker is not conceptually dissimilar to the rule
announced in Bender, although less emphasis was placed on economic factors to determine the reasonableness of the technology
employed by the senior appropriator in his diversion with regard to
his economic reach.
MESTAS v. ELEPHANT BUTTE IRRIGATION DISTRICT
It is now worthwhile to discuss Mestas and its holding in more
detail. To reiterate, five issues were presented to the court: 1)
whether the federal defendants had authority to allow the wells to be
drilled on their rights of way; 2) whether EBID had authority to
construct the wells, and if EBID and the Bureau of Reclamation had
authority to drill the wells; 3) whether the prior appropriative right
of plaintiffs was impaired as a result of the wells; 4) whether the use
of the groundwater by pumping it into irrigation ditches constituted
waste which would then bar such a use; and 5) whether the water
could be sold or had to be apportioned pro rata to all lands within
the district.'

1

7

The issue involving EBID's authority to drill was decided by granting partial summary judgment in EBID's favor. The court also
decided that the Bureau of Reclamation had the authority to allow
construction of the wells on its rights of way.' 1 8
Impairment Issues
Having decided these preliminary issues, the court turned to a
consideration of whether plaintiffs' rights had been impaired. EBID
argued that first, plaintiffs lacked standing under the rule of Pecos
Valley Artesian Conservancy District v. Peters' 1 9 and therefore,
could not without proof of the date of their original appropriation
and the amount and continuity of their beneficial use, assert impairment and shift the burden of proof to defendants. The second argument that EBID advanced was that no water right impairment had
116.
117.
1979).
118.
119.

Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627, 636 (1973).
Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 2 (D.N.M. May 11,
Id. at 11.
52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
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taken place; i.e., that if there was any impairment, it was to the
wells, and not to the water rights per se.
Standing
Judge Bratton answered EBID's first argument by concluding that
to use the word standing was misleading because there was no question regarding a preliminary jurisdictional requirement. The court
further stated that the Pecos rule applied only to the question of the
burdens of proof in a claim involving a limited amount of water.
Concluding that the facts of Mestas gave no indication but that there
existed ample amounts of water, the court decided that the Pecos
rule was inapplicable and therefore was not a bar to consideration of
the impairment question.
It is arguable whether Pecos and Mestas are distinguishable. For
impairment to exist in any event there must be some question
whether the allegedly impaired parties are receiving their historically
defined quantity and/or quality of water, limited by the condition
that the water has been put to a beneficial use. The Pecos rule merely
requires proof of the extent of the senior right before placing upon
the subsequent appropriators the burden of showing that a surplus
exists from which they can draw without impairment to the prior
appropriators.
The argument against the Pecos principle is twofold. First, it
appears to completely ignore the concept of a right to a means of
diversion. Instead, the Pecos rule concerns itself solely with the issue
of quantity of a water right. Ignoring a qualitative problem, it virtually forecloses consideration of water quality without having
addressed the question itself-specifically, whether such a right of
diversion, judicially recognized in many parts of the western United
States, exists and should be protected in New Mexico. Secondly, the
rule in Pecos, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of that case,
may effectively foreclose any impairment litigation because the costs
of meeting the evidentiary burden far exceed the possible benefits to
be derived from bringing the case. Such a standard is unreasonable
and could serve to deprive water rights holders in non-declared basins
of New Mexico of the ability to protect their constitutionally guaranteed rights in that water. The Pecos rule is so manifestly burdensome
and inequitable that it only invites subsequent courts to finely, and
perhaps artificially, distinguish the cases upon their facts in order to
do justice.
Having decided the "standing" issue, the Mestas court then turned
to the question of whether the lowering of the water table, in combination with the increasing quality degradation due to the advancing
salinity, amounted to an impairment of plaintiffs' rights.
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Impairment From Lowering of the Water Table
In resolving the question as to whether lowering of the water table
in itself constitutes impairment, Judge Bratton cited Heine v. Reynolds;' 2 0 Mathers v. Texaco;' 21 and City of Roswell v. Reynolds.' 22 The Mestas opinion placed primary emphasis on Mathers,
construing Mathers as supporting the proposition that the "water
right does not include the element of perpetuity and [that a] ...
lowering of the water table does not constitute impairment in a
limited water situation.' 21 In light of the fact that Mestas did not
involve a limited water supply, Judge Bratton's opinion stated that
the Mathers rule would be equally, if not more, applicable to the
Mestas facts than to the Mathers situation.' 24 The court therefore
applied the Mathers rationale and concluded that a simple lowering
of a water table does not constitute impairment, especially where the
basin apparently is a recharging basin.
The court's holding can be criticized on two grounds. First, in
addition to misreading Mathers,' 2 S it chose to ignore the language of
City of Roswell v. Reynolds 1 2 6 which, in construing Mathers, stated
that "[i] t does not follow that the lowering of the water table may
never in itself constitute an impairment of existing rights.' 2 7 Thus,
it is not a general rule, although stated as such by the court in
Mestas, that a lowering of the water table never constitutes impairment. In order to reach a determination that the lowering of a water
table does not per se amount to impairment, the facts of the particular
case must be analyzed, all characteristics of the particular aquifer
being considered. ' 28
It should be noted that the theory of a right to a means of diver120. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
121. 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
122. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
123. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 14 (D.N.M. May 11,
1979). It should be noted that the Mathers court did not state that the "lowering of the
water table does not constitute impairment," rather it merely reiterated Application of
Brown, which stated, "the lowering of a water table.., does not necessarily constitute an
impairment..." (emphasis added), 65 N.M. at 80, 332 P.2d at 479. The court in Mathers
did conclude, however, that the lowering of the water table did not constitute impairment
under the facts of the particular case. This is not to say that a lowering of the water table
may never constitute impairment; that determination can only be made after examination
of the facts of the particular case.
124. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 14 (D.N.M. May 11,
1979).
125. See note 123 supra.
126. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
127. Id at 253, 522 P.2d at 800.
128. Motion for rehearing, Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 80, 332 P.2d 475, 479

(1958).
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sion assumes that a lowering of the water table in itself could impair
that right. The determination as to whether any particular lowering
of a water table amounts to an impairment of a groundwater right
would rest on the extent of the right to a means of diversion. In its
past analyses, the New Mexico Supreme Court has completely ignored such a concept in spite of the fact that it has discussed and
decided cases involving questions of impairment caused by a lowering
of the water table. Seemingly, the two issues are inseparable and one
cannot be addressed without addressing the other.
The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that in every case involving these issues, rights within a declared basin were in dispute,
and hence the State Engineer was involved. According to
Hutchins,' 29 the case law protecting a right to a means of diversion
has arisen in situations where the groundwaters are essentially unregulated rather than in cases involving appropriations under an
administrative procedure and a State Engineer. 1 30 Hutchins argues
that a right to a means of diversion has no place in groundwater law
where the groundwater is regulated by the state because, in such a
situation, all those who are granted permits to drill are on notice,
from the first appropriator on down, that there exists an implied
condition on their appropriation that the water table necessarily will
go down. Hence, there can be no right in such situations to a diversion at historical levels.' 3 1
Therefore, in basin cases, it is arguable that there is no right to a
means of diversion. Because in New Mexico all cases concerning a
lowering of the water table apparently have arisen within the context
of a declared basin, it is understandable that New Mexico courts have
not addressed the issue of a right to a means of diversion.
A second criticism of the decision in Mestas is that the court cited
case law dealing with declared basins in deciding a non-declared basin
case. The situations are fundamentally different, and the rules applicable to one should not be extended to the other. The rules and
regulations of the State Engineer have, to a large extent, superceded
the common law. But, in the non-declared basins, the State Engineer
has no jurisdiction and hence the only protections a prior appropriator has for his water are his common law remedies under the
western water law doctrine of prior appropriation and an application
of that doctrine, the right to a means of diversion. A decision in
non-declared basin cases cannot be logically rendered by construing
opinions in which statutory law and the regulations of the State
129. Supra note 77.

130. Supra note 77 at 176-79.
131. Supra note 77 at 179.
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Engineer have been determinative. The Mestas court concluded,
nevertheless, that such cases were applicable.' 32
Impairment by an Increase in Salt Content of Groundwater
In resolving the question as to whether decreasing water quality
constitutes impairment, the Mestas court again cited Heine v. Reynolds" 33 and Roswell v. Reynolds,' " both of which cases involved
situations of increasing salinity within an aquifer. The court pointed
out the fact that those cases concerned non-recharging basins. Noting
that there was no information regarding the impact of gradual mineralization of the water in the aquifer, Judge Bratton concluded that
there existed no means by which the court could determine whether
the increased salinity claimed by plaintiffs amounted to an impairment of their rights.' 3 The Mestas court stated that "the effects ... observed [by the
farmers in the area] relate only to the functioning of their wells and
not to the integrity of their water rights."' 36 However, it was observed that at some future point "the interference with performance
of their wells might become, for all practical purposes, a question of
water right impairment."' I I The court decided that impairment had
not yet been established, but that jurisdiction would be continued
over the case in order that, if necessary, the impairment question
could be considered in the future.
Waste and Pro Rata Apportionment
Referring to regulations' 3 8 of the State Engineer, the court held
that all water pumped from any EBID well must be used within a
maximum of 1 /2miles from the well.' I I The court also held that all
water pumped from the wells "be apportioned to each landowner
pro rata to the lands assessed."' 40
132. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 14 (D.N.M. May 11,
1979).
133. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
134. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
135. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 16 (D.N.M. May 11,
1979).
136. Id. at 15.
137. Id. at 16.
138. STATE ENGINEER, RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING DRILLING OF
WELLS AND APPROPRIATION AND USE OF GROUNDWATER IN NEW MEXICO
§ 1-11 (1966).
139. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 18 (D.N.M. May 11,
1979).
140. Id at 20.
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Thus, EBID's victory on the impairment issues was a hollow one.
The practical effect of the decision was to enjoin EBID's use of the
wells since it no longer would be economical for EBID to continue to
use the wells, given the restrictions.' 4'
CONCLUSION
Although New Mexico courts have not yet addressed the issue of a
right to a means of diversion, there is little doubt that such a right
would be recognized, given a suitable case. Clearly, situations involving declared basins are not appropriate for acknowledgement of such
a right. In non-declared groundwater basins, however, where the
senior appropriator is without the protection of the State Engineer,
the New Mexico courts should recognize the right to a means of
diversion as an integral part of the prior appropriative right. To hold
that there exists no right to a means of diversion would deny the
appropriative groundwater right holder the full extent of his distinct
usufructory right.
Even if a right to a means of diversion exists in New Mexico, the
extent of such a right is unknown. The extent of the right is necessarily a decision which the courts of each state must make based
upon their perception of the relevant public policies.
If a state seeks a maximum level of economic development, new
sources of water must be found and developed. Strict assertion of
senior appropriators' rights to their means of diversion, however,
prevents significant expansion of the water supply. It is for this
reason that the Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion arose, as a limitation on the private right to further a public policy of maximum
economic development.
The Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion, however, does not completely eliminate the individual's prior appropriative right to his
means of diversion. It merely demands that the means chosen be
reasonable in light of the desire to attain optimal water use. It is in
the Bender case that the doctrine is most clearly enunciated, with the
court having engaged in an economic analysis to decide reasonableness. This analysis would extend not only to the technology of well
drilling and pumping, but also to the economic reach of the prior
appropriator as opposed to the economic benefits of maximization
of the resource. Under the Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion, the
historical water table level apparently would no longer be protected,
141. The court denied a Motion to Reconsider by Defendant EBID and consequently
EBID has appealed the decision on the waste and pro rata issues to the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
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but would instead, depending on the reasonableness of the diversion,
afford the prior appropriator compensatory relief enabling him to
continue to satisfy his water right while at the same time ensuring
maximum development of water resources.
The Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion is an equitable solution to
the conflict between individual rights and a public policy demanding
maximum development of water resources. It is apparent, however,
that when one views the manner in which society presently is handling groundwater resources, not to mention other non-renewable
resources, little if any value is being placed on groundwater resources
with respect to any generation but the present. To quote Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen, it is a complete "monopoly of the present over
future generations." '1 42 The goal of maximization of groundwater
use and development necessarily means the eventual depletion of the
resource, apparently with the presupposition that the value of
groundwater to the present generation exceeds the value to future
generations. Does the present generation owe anything more to the
future generation? The Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion presumably
answers that question in the negative. If, however, a state were to
place a value on groundwater for the use of future generations, no
tool would better serve that purpose than the recognition of a near4 3
absolute right of the prior appropriator to his means of diversion.
By protecting the prior appropriator's right to his historical means of
diversion, water use and development will be substantially limited
because a junior appropriator will not be allowed to use groundwater
when such use will interfere with the senior's diversion. As a result,
unused water will remain in the depths of the underground basins,
waiting to be tapped by future generations.
Thus, any state that addresses the issue of the impairment of the
rights of prior appropriators, specifically with respect to their rights
to means of diversion, must decide what goals it is seeking to further
through its water laws. If maximization of water use and development is the end sought, then the Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion
would be the appropriate means to that end. If, however, the state
perceives a need or obligation to preserve its water resources, enforcement of a prior right to a means of diversion, unbridled by a
reasonableness limitation, might best serve that goal.
In Mestas, the United States District Court did not discuss either
the issue of a right to a means of diversion nor the possible limitation
142. Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths, 41 S. ECON. J. 347, 377 (1975).
143. Professor Charles T. DuMars of the University of New Mexico School of Law has
greatly aided the author in developing this concept.

July 1980]

GROUNDWATER DIVERSION

of that right through application of the Doctrine of Reasonable
Diversion. The court did, though, leave the door open for reconsideration of the question of whether the performance of a well might
become a question of water right impairment.4 It is precisely this
question which has been decided by those courts that have recognized a right to a means of groundwater diversion.
It is urged that the Mestas court re-think the impairment issue and
acknowledge a right on the part of the prior appropriators to a
reasonable means of diversion, concomitant to their appropriative
right. The extent of such a right would depend upon the court's
perception of the New Mexico public policy. On the basis of New
Mexico Constitutional 4 s and statutory' 46 pronouncements that
water be put to beneficial use, it is a fair conclusion that New Mexico
favors a policy of maximum development of its groundwater resources, as opposed to a policy of preservation for future generations. Consequently, the Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion would
seem to serve New Mexico's purposes.
KEVIN J. BLISS

144. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B, at 16 (D.N.M. May 11,
1979).
145. N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 3.
146. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-2 (1978).

